IMPACT OF THE INSIDER CONTROL ON THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF RUSSIAN STATE CORPORATIONS
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IMPACT OF THE INSIDER CONTROL ON THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF RUSSIAN STATE CORPORATIONS
Annotation
PII
S0207-36760000392-0-1
DOI
10.31857/S60000392-0-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Edition
Pages
122-133
Abstract
The paper considers the features of formation of state corporations in Russia, legislation in this field, state corporations' advantages and disadvantages, the estimation of the quality of state control over their activities. The following analysis is carried out basing on the model of informal, insider control over the assets on behalf of the state functionaries and executives. The paper unravels the mechanism of private appropriation of insider rent, i.e. of incomes derived by big insiders from the state corporations' financial flows. The indicators measuring the scale of the funds withdrawal are suggested. The main negative effects of the systematic seizure of funds, first of all damage to the investment strategies of state corporations are also described in the paper. In general, the paper reflects the main results of the author's research and justifies the assumption that within the dominant neo-liberal economic model that supports the system of peripheral capitalism in Russia the functioning of state corporations was doomed to a lack of efficiency, handicap and an empty waste of public resources.
Keywords
rent-seeking behavior, state corporations, insider control, insider rent, инвестиции, investments
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